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RECENT DECISIONS
fered only in that it was slightly more sophisticated in its selection of a
basis for the computation.
What the court is trying to protect, it seems, is the jury's preroga-
tive to use their own mental processes, not too strongly impaired by
argument based on speculation beyond the record, to determine what
the plaintiff is entitled to recover. Arguments which tend to "short cir-
cuit" these mental processes through the use of formulas which distract
the jury stand on the same ground as passion or prejudice, and are
equivolently disallowed. The court ably pointed this out in the Affett
case when it said that the only purpose in using the mathematical form-
ula argument was to "displace the jury's concept of what is a fair and
reasonable amount to compensate for pain and suffering."1 7
The author feels that the proper distinction was made by the Illinois
court in Caley v. Manicke,18 which involved a fact situation similar to
the Affett and Botta cases. The court there stated in relation to the
monetary award of the jury for pain and suffering: "This determina-
tion like many others that a jury must make is left to its conscience and
judgment. A determination reached by a speculative process which is
easier to comprehend than to define and upon which just and wise men
may disagree does not indicate that it is a 'blind guess.' "19 The Illinois
court also held in a case2 0 similar to Wisconsin's Halstead case that a
lump sum argument to the jury is proper. The court reaffirmed this posi-
tion in the Caley case, saying: "[W]e consider such practice far less
misleading than the argument of a mathematical formula .... ,"2, This is
essentially what the Wisconsin court has held.
Louis J. ANDREW, JR.
Dometic Relations: Domicile of Military Personnel: The plain-
tiff in Lauterbach v. Lauterbachl was a member of the United States
Air Force who had been stationed in Alaska under military orders since
July, 1960. Nine months previous to the bringing of a divorce action
in an Alaska court, he had filed a complaint for a divorce in Pennsyl-
vania, the state of his marriage. The defendant wife contended that by
so doing, the plaintiff had shown a lack of intent to treat Alaska as his
permanent residence. The Alaska statutes provide that
no person may commence an action for divorce until he has been
a resident of the state for at least one year before the commence-
ment of the action.2
17 1 Wis. 2d at 613, 106 N.W. 2d at 279.
Is 24 Ill. 2d 390, 182 N.E. 2d 206 (1962).
19 Id. at 393, 182 N.E. 2d at 208.
20 Graham v. Mattoon City R.R., 234 Ill. 483, 84 N.E. 1070 (1909).
21 Caley v. Manicke, supra note 18, at 394, 182 N.E. 2d at 209.
1392 P. 2d 24 (Alaska 1964).2 ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.140 (1964).
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A person serving in a military branch of the United States gov-
ernment who has been continuously stationed in a military base
or installation in the state for a period of one year shall be
deemed a resident in good faith of the state for the purpose of
ss. 70-230 of this chapter.3
The defendant argued that the statutes require technical domicile
of one year, regardless of whether the party is a civilian or a member
of the military. Therefore, she contended that since the plaintiff did
not have the necessary domiciliary intent, the Alaska court did not have
jurisdiction. The superior court dismissed the complaint on this basis.
The state supreme court reversed the decision and held that for
purposes of divorce there was no requirement of domicile for military
personnel stationed in Alaska. The court stated that the only purpose of
the legislature in enacting the law was to lift the burden on military
personnel which resulted from a territorial court decision 4 holding that
the court had no jurisdiction to grant a divorce to a person in the mili-
tary service stationed in Alaska because he could not freely choose
Alaska as his home and could therefore not establish a domicile.
The general requirements of domicile are that there be a concur-
rence of physical presence and intent to make one's permanent residence
in the given location.
A change of residence for divorce purposes is not effected merely
by going to live in another place; an essential element of a change
of residence is intention, or animus manendi, which has been
variously defined as the intent to reside in the new place perma-
nently or indefinitely, or to make the new place one's permanent
home, or as the absence of an intention to live elsewhere. ...
The intent must be to 'do it now'; there must be an intent while
residing in a new place, to make such a place one's home in the
future.5
The reason for maintaining the requirement of domicile is that by so
doing, divorce-minded couples are prevented from shopping for favor-
able divorce laws.
The basis for divorce law in all the states is statutory, and, with only
a few exceptions, the statutes require a certain period of "residence"
or that a party be a "bona fide resident"7 or a "resident in good faith."'
These statutes are uniformly contrued to require the elements of domi-
cile; namely, presence and intentY The states which do not supplement
3 ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.160 (1964).
4Wilson v. Wilson, 10 Alaska 616 (1945).
5 17 Am. JUR. Divorce and Separation § 286 (1957).
6LA. STAT. § 9:301 (1962).
7 DEL. STAT. § 13:1525 (1962).8
KAN. STAT. § 60:1502 (1961).
917 Am. JuR. Divorce and Separation § 281 (1957).
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these all-inclusive statutes with provisions for special treatment of mili-
tary personnel essentially fall into two categories.
A distinct minority of states hold that a person who is in the mili-
tary service and is ordered to live in government housing can never
establish a residence which will qualify him for a divorce action. 10 As
was discussed in Lauterbach, the reasoning is that since he is under
military discipline it is impossible to form the necessary intent.
The other group of states allow the serviceman to establish his in-
tent by affirmative proof. A showing that he has registered to vote in
the state in the last election will carry great weight in showing his in-
tent." Other significant proof may be the listing of his home town on
his service records,'12 the holding of a state driver's license,' 3 or the
fact that his family is living with him. 14
The serviceman who lives off-base in a home he has rented will
often be considered to have established a domicile.' 5 However, he will
have to show the same type of proof of intent as does the serviceman
who lives in government housing, under orders, in the second group of
states.
Most of the states which do have statutes specifically dealing with
jurisdiction over servicemen have used approximately the same word-
ing as that of the Alaska statute. However, these states do differ as to
whether they require the serviceman to have been "continuously sta-
tioned' on, or a "resident'1 7 of, the military reservation.
The somewhat ambiguous statutory declaration that "residence" on
a military reservation satisfies the "residence requirement" has appar-
ently not caused the difficulty that one might expect. An illustration is
the Kansas statute s which requires that a person applying for a divorce
must be an "actual resident in good faith," but provides that a person
who has been a "resident of any United States army post or military
reservation" may bring a divorce action. It could be argued that since
the word "resident" standing by itself is generally held to mean "domi-
ciliary," the serviceman must still show domicile under this statute.
However, the Kansas court in Craig v.. Craig9 held that the statute
completely eliminated the requirement of domicile with respect to mili-
tary personnel.
10 Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 162 Pa. Super. 22, 56 A. 2d 362 (1948).
"I Schaefer v. Schaefer, 245 Iowa 1374, 66 N.W. 2d 428 (1954).
12 Earhart v. Earhart, 358 S.W. 2d 878 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
"s Plank v. Plank, 5 Cumb. 134 (Pa. 1950).
14 Sasse v. Sasse, 41 Wash. 2d 363, 249 P. 2d 380 (1952).
15 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 76b (1959).
16 NEB. STAT. § 42:303 (1963). New Mexico and Texas have similar statutes.
17 OKLA. STAT. § 12.1272 (1964). Kansas, Georgia, and Kentucky have similar
statutes. Florida's statute applies to military personnel "living within the
borders of the state."
8 KAN, STAT. § 60:1502 (1961).
19 143 Kan. 624, 56 P. 2d 464 (1936).
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Alaska is the most recent state to construe a statute containing the
phrase "continuously stationed." New Mexico 20 and Texas 21 had previ-
ously reached the same result in construing this terminology. The lan-
guage of the Alaska statute is quite specific in its rejection of domiciliary
intent as a basis for jurisdiction. The Alaska court was, however, con-
cerned with a constitutional issue similar to that considered by the
North Carolina Supreme Court in Martin v. Martin.2 There the court
construed a statute which provided that a serviceman who had been
"stationed" on a military base would be deemed to have complied with
the "residence requirement." The court held that the statute was per-
missive only; the serviceman would henceforth be permitted to show
a domiciliary intent. It was held that domicile is constitutionally the
only basis for divorce jurisdiction. The court specifically discussed and
disagreed with the reasoning of the Kansas" and New Mexico 1 courts
which had held that domicile was not the only basis.
The North Carolina court relied heavily on a United States court
of appeals decision in Alton v. Alton.2' By a 4 to 3 decision the court
held that the jurisdictional requirement of domicile is guaranteed by
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. This decision was an
extension of the Supreme Court's holding that, for purposes of full
faith and credit, domicile is the only basis for divorce jurisdiction .2
The Alton decision represents one line of thought in the federal courts,
which require domicile to satisfy due process.
Other courts have held that full faith and credit does not involve
the same rights as does due process 2 7 and that within the borders of
the state, or with respect to all persons who appeared as parties before
the state court, the divorce decree is binding,28 provided that the law
requires a reasonable basis for jurisdiction. The effect of this is ap-
parent in the Lauterbach decision. The court was very careful to point
out, both by supporting argument and direct statement, that there was
a reasonable basis for the law in question.
It discussed the contribution of the military establishment to the
economy of the state, the social inter-relationships between civilians and
the military, and particularly the aid given by the military during the
earthquake disaster. The court concluded:
20 Wallace v. Wallace, 63 N.M. 414, 320 P. 2d 1020 (1958).
21 Wood v. Wood, 159 Tex. 350, 320 S.W. 2d 807 (1959).
22253 N.C. 704, 118 S.E. 2d 29 (1961).
23 Craig v. Craig, supra note 19.
24 Wallace v. Wallace, supra note 20.
25207 F. 2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953).
2 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
27 Alton v. Alton, supra note 25, at 678.
28 Sutton v. Leib, 188 F. 2d 766 (7th Cir. 1951). This decision was reversed
by the United States Supreme Court in Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952),
but the reversal rested upon "full faith and credit," not upon "due process."
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These facts are pointed out to show that Alaska has a real and
substantial basis for its interest in the domestic affairs of service
families that reside here for one year .... The marital problems
of service people in, this state are as deserving of solution under
our laws as are the marital problems of our civilian population 2 9
The New Mexico court, 0 after a similar recital of reasons for hold-
ing that the state has a valid interest in the serviceman, concluded that
the "reasonableness" of the statute would also satisfy any "full faith
and credit" requirement:
Much of the confusion has arisen on account of the divorce
granted 'while you wait' type of short residence period statutes
that lead courts in other states to refuse 'full faith and credit'
being fully aware of the subterfuge oftentimes employed. The
amendment before us is not one that is suspect on that ground
or lends itself to the quick and easy method attractive to divorce-
minded people from other jurisdictions. . . . Wle entertain
little doubt but that a divorce judgment rendered in conformity
with this amendment will be recognized elsewhere.3'
The problem of jurisdiction over servicemen whose home is not
in the state has not been decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
The court has adhered to the classic definition of domicile in construing
the statutory requirement of "residence." In Hall v. Hall32 the court
said:
Intent and fact of residence must concur.... I can but think it
means that the plaintiff shall, in fact and intent, have an estab-
lished home in the state for the preceding year-a place where he
lives and has an abode; where he would be liable to taxation;
where service of process of court could be had upon him by copy;
and where he has an actual habitation .... 33
The Wisconsin court, when the issue arises, will in all probability
adopt the rule that a serviceman living in housing assigned to him may
show his intent to remain in the state, and qualify for a divorce. He
could show this intent by any of the means previously stated.
It is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin or that
of any other state would, in the absence of a statutory mandate, do
away with the requirement of domicile as a prerequisite to jurisdiction.
The term "resident," standing by itself, is universally interpreted to
be synonymous with "domiciliary" when used in a statute declaring
the jurisdictional basis for divorce.
The language of Lauterbach which argues that the state has a
definite interest in the marital problems of the military personnel sta-
29 Lauterbach v. Lauterbach, supra note 1, at 26, 27.
30 Wood v. Wood, supra note 21.
31320 S.W. 2d at 811.
3225 Wis. 600 (1870).
33 d. at 607, 608.
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tioned in the state could be used in arguing for a judicial departure
from the requirement of domicile, but, as was shown above, the court
used this argument to show that there was a reasonable basis for the
statute. The plight of the serviceman who is unable to return to his
home state to bring a divorce action and is precluded from proving
domicile in the state where he is stationed can be remedied by statutory
enactment. However, even this relief may be illusory, since his divorce
may be open to attack on the basis of lack of jurisdiction in the courts
of other states.
CHARLES P. GRUMLEY
